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SYMPOSIUM
As We Forgive Our Debtors
Foreword
FRANK R. KENNEDY*
In a recent issue of the Journal of Legal Education, Professor Peter
Schuck asks Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?' He
argues that the professorial neglect of this kind of scholarship has had
unfortunate effects on law teaching and notes how "the two newest class-
room orthodoxies" in law schools-law and economics and critical legal
studies-undervalue factual data. 2 Professor Wiseman, in her contribution
to this symposium, likewise laments the reluctance of legal scholars to
undertake empirical research but focuses more directly on the unfortunate
consequences of this neglect for policy formulation that underlies legislation.
Professor Schuck attempts to explain academic reluctance to pursue empir-
ical research by identifying nine disincentives and proposes a remedy in the
form of enhancement of academic rewards.4 One is tempted to point out
that the empirical study that is the focus of this symposium demonstrates
the unreliability of assumptions as to the effectiveness of incentives to steer
large numbers of people into particular courses of conduct, 5 but an incentive
* Thomas M. Cooley Professor Emeritus, University of Michigan Law School; Executive
Director of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws, 1971-73. J.S.D., 1953, Yale University;
LL.B., 1939, Washington University; A.B., 1935, Southwest Missouri State University.
1. 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323 (1989).
2. Id. at 326.
3. Wiseman, Women in Bankruptcy and Beyond, 65 IND. L.J. 107 (1989).
4. Schuck, supra note 1, at 331-33. The nine disincentives discouraging empirical research
are: (1) inconvenience, (2) lack of control, (3) tedium, (4) uncertainty, (5) ideology, (6)
resources, (7) time, (8) tenure and (9) training. The remedial proposal would make appropriate
allowances and adjustments in the making of tenure decisions to reward scholarly endeavor in
empirical research projects. Id.
5. T. SuLLivAN, E. WARREN & J. VESTBROOK, As WE FORGIvE OUR DEBToRs 335, 339
(1989) [hereinafter AWFOD].
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program may nevertheless be worthwhile without regard to the number of
people induced thereby to change their behavior.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and its 1984 amendments were
designed by Congress to steer debtors in their choice of statutory relief.
Both Congress and its critics, however, have relied on untested empirical
assumptions. And as the number of consumer debtors seeking relief under
the Bankruptcy Code increased from slightly less than 200,000 in 1979 to
473,000 in 1987,6 the opportunity and need for empirical exploration became
increasingly pressing. Thus both the policy makers and legal scholars are
deeply indebted to the authors of As We Forgive Our Debtors (A WFOD)
for their monumental study of consumer bankruptcy, the most ambitious
such project ever completed.
Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook acknowledge that they wanted to chal-
lenge the use of simplistic and untested economic models and the illusion
of the human as a rational maximizer of economic gain as guides for
legislative action.7 More concretely, they sought to undermine the preach-
ments of the consumer credit industry and the law-and-economics guild that
bankruptcy was being exploited by individuals well able to pay their debts
and that the gates should be closed or made harder to climb over. The
authors do not deny that their views influenced the questions they asked
and the conclusions they drew. As Professor Wiseman summarizes,
[t]heir conclusions, based on their data, are that the explosion of
consumer credit and the increased volatility in the American economy
are the primary systemic factors in the increase in bankruptcy filings
and that the economic model was an incomplete and invalid predictor
of how flesh and blood men and women debtors would behave in a
bankruptcy context.-
This symposium is the beginning of the dialogue that Sullivan, Warren
and Westbrook's work will stimulate. The diversity of the articles and
commentary in this issue reflect not only the richness of the data they have
collected, but its widespread implications.
THE ROLE OF EMPIRIcAL DATA IN DEVELOPING BANKRUPTCY
LEGISLATION FOR INDIVIDUALS
MARJORIE GIRTH
Professor Girth's contribution to this symposium is an evaluation of the
role of empirical data in the formulation of legislation, with particular
6. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 527 (Table No. 866) (1989).
7. AWFOD, supra note 5, at 234-36, 243-54, 340.
8. Wiseman, supra note 3, at 108 n.9.
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reference to the utility of the data gathered by Sullivan, Warren and
Westbrook for the purpose of informing Congress about possible reforms
in consumer bankruptcy laws. It is sometimes said that the principal product
of an empirical research project is identification of the mistakes made in
its design and the procedures followed and that its principal benefit is to
provide guidance for further research. Professor Girth does not repeat that
put-down of the worth of empirical research, but she does highlight limi-
tations on the utility of the findings and conclusions presented in As We
Forgive Our Debtors and reminds us of how much we still do not know.
Professor Girth speaks out of extended experience in the conduct and use
of empirical research in connection with the development of sound legislative
policy for bankruptcy, having served as one of the two principal researchers
and authors of the Brookings study, Bankruptcy: Problem, Process, Re-
form. 9 This study was an important source of empirical data about the
operation of the bankruptcy system under the Act that was repealed in
1978.
Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook explain in As We Forgive Our Debtors
why data sampled from the three states of Illinois, Pennsylvania and Texas
appeared to be well chosen, 0 and most readers, contemplating the alter-
natives, probably resolved any doubts in favor of the authors. Nevertheless,
Professor Girth levels at this choice the unsmiling observation that "[t]here
is no way to know from these data whether these three states in fact
represent the experience of bankrupt individuals nationwide. '"' While ac-
knowledging that "rigorous data processing procedures" 2 were used and
that extensive findings were reported in great detail, Professor Girth char-
acterizes the findings as of three kinds: "(1) those for which the reported
data are 'quite firm'; (2) those based upon the authors' explicit assumptions
affecting the data, [i.e.,] . . . 'artificial'; and (3) those 'invalid' conclusions
... based upon data whose defects have unacknowledged consequences.' 13
Professor Girth declares all the factual findings of A WFOD questionable
because the authors decided to limit their data to information provided by
the debtors on their schedules.1 4 She points out that as a result critics may
discount the data completely, but she rejects that approach, apparently
acknowledging the practical necessity of using self-reported data and the
unacceptability of "a total factual vacuum."' 5 Instead, she advises legislators
9. D. STANLEY & M. GmTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PRocEss, REFORM (1971). See infra
notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
10. AWFOD, supra note 5, at 18-19.
11. Girth, The Role of Empirical Data in Developing Bankruptcy Legislation for Indivi-
duals, 65 IND. L.J. 17, 17 n.5 (1989).
12. Id. at 17-18.
13. Id. at 18.
14. Id. at 19.
15. Id. at 20.
1989]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
to make discriminating use of the findings and conclusions with due regard
to the firmness of the underlying data.' 6
Professor Girth sets out 13 conclusions 7 for which the data were "quite
firm," including, for example, that the generosity of a state's exemption
laws did not'have a significant effect upon an individual debtor's choice of
Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. The last conclusion in this group is that "reluc-
tant" creditors must be analyzed separately from the "voluntary" partici-
pants in the consumer industry. Professor Girth opines without explanation
that "when further amendments to the 1978 Code are considered," it is
important to recognize the differences between these classes of creditors."
In her discussion of conclusions for which the data are "explicitly
artificial," Professor Girth includes the conclusion that bankrupt individuals
are "'pretty close to a cross-section' of American workers," since the
information relied on was provided by only 73% of the sampled petitioners. 9
Findings based on scheduled asset values are said to be flawed because
standards relied on by petitioners were unknown. 20 The points seem not to
be major.
Professor Girth criticizes the authors' conclusions regarding the ability of
nonentrepreneurial Chapter 7 debtors to pay all or substantial portions of
their debts as based on unverifiable assumptions regarding asset values.
Girth finds the authors' conclusions that reluctant creditors would receive
very little payment even if 20% of the income of nonentrepreneurial debtors
was mandated for debt repayment more than plausible but based on artificial
numbers. She categorizes the authors' conclusions about the incidence of
income interruption and volatility among nonentrepreneurial debtors as
based on tenuous or "sketchy" data.2' The authors themselves admit that
their effort to demonstrate that no more than 10% of nonentrepreneurial
Chapter 7 debtors could pay 100% of their debts in a Chapter 13 proceeding
if they lived on a "low household budget" could be subject to the criticism
that their analysis required a highly artificial series of assumptions.2 Pro-
fessor Girth concludes after her survey of the conclusions based on artificial
assumptions that legislators should use such results very cautiously.2 How-
ever, she comments that "we obviously know much more than we did
before,'"' and guardedly suggests that a legislator might say that the burden
rests on those who believe missing data would significantly change our
16. Id.
17. Id. at 20-29.
18. Id. at 29.
19. Id. at 29-30 (quoting, in part, AWFOD, supra note 5, at 85).
20. Id. at 30-31.
21. Id. at 33-35.
22. Id. at 36,
23. Id. at 37.
24. Id.
[Vol. 65:1
FOREWORD
understanding of the bankruptcy process for individuals-a formidable
burden because of its cost.25 Her final comment respecting these conclusions
is that a legislator could well say "that data whose limits are clearly revealed
constitute a step forward from the total factual vacuum that would otherwise
surround the legislative process."' 6
Professor Girth's severest and most extended criticisms are directed at
the authors' characterization of Chapter 13 debtors as victims who "bought
a bill of goods ' 27 and "were cheated by a system that made unjustified
promises of successful repayments and reestablished creditworthiness ' 28 and
who "paid money they could ill afford for advice to file bankruptcy in a
way that was likely to bring them nothing but grief." 29 Her characterization
of the authors' evidence marshaled "for this stinging assessment" as "not
impressive" 30 strikes this commentator as fair and well substantiated. She
points out that the only firm data for the 32% of the cases that failed were
snapshots taken at the time of the data collection. The projection of 6770
ultimate failure involved acceptance of interviewees' surmises. Since we do
not know from the data what the success rate would have been if the
sampled cases had been followed to their conclusion, she charges that "[t]o
imply otherwise in a study of this magnitude risks creating a seriously
misleading basis for future bankruptcy policy debates."'"
Professor Girth then offers the contrasting results of an empirical study
conducted in the Buffalo Division of the Western District of New York
that extended over seven to nine years.3 2 She notes that although the authors
predicted only a 33% success rate, 60% of the confirmed plans were
"successfully" completed. In reaching these figures, Professor Girth ac-
knowledges that her standard of success was less exacting than the total
repayment requirement contemplated in A WFOD. She also points out that
the median repayment proposal in the Buffalo study was between 25 and
29%, whereas the median of the proposed payments in the cases in the
A WFOD study was 45% .13 Professor Girth persuasively argues that the
persistence of the Buffalo debtors in fulfilling their plan commitments
suggests that a significant number of individuals find the resulting stress is
preferable to sale of nonexempt assets or selective repayment following
liquidation. At any rate, bankruptcy policy makers should attempt to learn
more about why so many debtors choose the Chapter 13 option and stick
25. Id.
26. Id. at 38.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 38-39.
30. Id. at 39.
31. Id. at 40.
32. Id. at 40-48.
33. Id. at 42-43.
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with it before accepting as proven the verdict of the three authors that
Chapter 13 is a snare and a delusion.
In a final section Professor Girth considers three possible legislative
strategies: (1) additional fine-tuning of the 1978 Code; (2) modifying the
Code's incentives for debtors and creditors; or (3) deferring consideration
of proposed amendments in recognition of the need to know more.
She concludes that notwithstanding the conscientious efforts of Sullivan,
Warren and Westbrook to provide bankruptcy policy makers with infor-
mation needed for evaluating the operation of the system as it applies to
consumer debtors, the data provided are uneven in quality and in large part
impressionistic.3 4- She concedes, however, that the resources required to
achieve significant improvement in quality are probably unavailable.3 5 Pro-
fessor Girth appropriately summarizes significant findings that are firm and
irrefutable:
[1] The proportion of additional "can pay" debtors who might be
identified among those who filed Chapter 7 proceedings is so low that
the yield would not be worth investing significant additional resources
in the effort.
[2] Neither total debt/income ratios nor exemption levels provide
effective ways of predicting petitioners' current choices between Chapter
7 and Chapter 13 as bankruptcy remedies....
[3] Similarly, currently available data on occupation and industry do
not readily identify the potential bankrupts within the American work-
force....
[4] Very few "true repeaters" who use bankruptcy as often as it
becomes available can be identified.3
The conclusion of this commentator is that the research of Sullivan,
Warren and Westbrook is a magnificent contribution to our knowledge of
the way the bankruptcy system operates with respect to consumer debtors,
and all of us who are interested in its improvement owe them an awesome
debt of gratitude for their devotion to the project that produced A WFOD.
The authors of As We Forgive Our Debtors try too hard to discredit the
thrust of the Purdue study in the direction of steering more Chapter 7
debtors into Chapter 13. Their bad-mouthing of the use of Chapter 13 is a
case of overkill, but that criticism does not diminish the overall value of
their monumental work.
As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS IN THE CLASSROOM
DOUGLASs G. BosHKOF
Professor Boshkoff's disquisition on the teaching and study of bankruptcy
after the publication of As We Forgive Our Debtors is required reading,
34. Id. at 64.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 63.
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along with the text of A WEOD, for all teachers of this subject. As he
reminds us, teachers of an earlier generation were blessed with the publi-
cation in 1971 of the Brookings study, Bankruptcy: Problem, Process,
Reform, by Stanley and Girth.3 7 The Brookings study was broader in scope
than the study that was the basis for A WFOD. It contained more empirical
data about the functioning of the bankruptcy system than had previously
been available, and its primary focus was on possibilities for reform of
bankruptcy administration. Publication of the Brookings study coincided
with the commencement of the study of the Commission on Bankruptcy
Laws, and the Brookings study provided teachers and students with a
valuable source for supplementing casebooks, treatises, and law reviews
with information about the actual operation of the system that was under-
going congressional review. The recommendations of the Brookings report
for the transfer of bankruptcy administration (except of Chapter X cases)
from the courts to an administrative agency38 engendered a storm of protest
from the bankruptcy bar,3 9 but the report undoubtedly was a factor in
Congress' partial acceptance of the proposals of the Commission on Bank-
ruptcy Laws for the extrication of bankruptcy judges from non-judicial
functions.40
During the 70's the teaching of bankruptcy took on a tentative cast by
virtue of the prospect for overhaul of the bankruptcy laws. Since 1978 the
study of bankruptcy has required an intensive examination of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act and the plethora of opinions of courts construing the Act.
Professor Boshkoff now suggests that the "[p]ublication of A WEOD should
mark the beginning of a period in which more academic attention is focused
on all aspects of the consumer bankruptcy process." '4' For one who during
his years of teaching debtors' and creditors' rights always devoted a generous
portion of time and attention to consumer bankruptcy, this prediction is
gratifying and, it is hoped, accurate.
37. See D. STANLEY & M. GIRm, supra note 9.
38. "Under the new bankruptcy system that we recommend: I. All bankruptcy cases except
reorganizations of corporations would be handled by a newly established administrative agency
using the most effective modem procedures." Id. at 4.
39. See, e.g., Kruger, Book Review, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 381 (1973); Levit, Bankruptcy
Administration and the Brookings Report-A Critical Analysis, 77 CoM. L.J. 179 (1972);
Margolis, Bankruptcy and the Brookings Institution, 74 CREDIT AND FIN. MGMT. No. 9, 8, 28
(Sept. 1972); see also Cyr, The Abandonment of Judicial Proceedings: A Commitment to
Consumer Disservice, 78 CoM. L.J. 37 (1973); Goodwin, Updating the Bankruptcy System in
the U.S., 74 CREDIT AND FIN. MamTr. No. 9, 22, 22-23 (Sept. 1972); Lavien, Water a Myth
and Watch it Growl, 79 CoM. L.J. 116 (1974).
40. The United States Trustee system now established by 28 U.S.C. §§ 588-589(a) (1982
and Supp. V. 1987) falls short of fully implementing the recommendations of the Commission
in its two-volume report. REPORT oF THE COMISSION ON TE BAN x uprcY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess., pt. I, ch. 5, at 103-56 (1973); id.
pt. II, ch. III, at 51-65.
41. Boshkoff, "As We Forgive Our Debtors" in the Classroom, 65 IND. L.J. 65, 82-83
(1989).
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In Part I of his article Professor Boshkoff briefly surveys the organization
of courses and materials available for the teaching of bankruptcy in Amer-
ican law schools. He notes that three routes are taken: (1) the first allows
no more than passing attention to bankruptcy in a course devoted primarily
to secured transactions; (2) the second divides attention fairly evenly between
Article 9 of the U.C.C. and bankruptcy; and (3) the third concentrates on
bankruptcy. Teachers and casebook editors who take the second and third
routes are oppressed by the burden of dealing with a new body of bankruptcy
law that includes the chapters on rehabilitation. 42 Although the Bankruptcy
Act had more rehabilitative chapters than the current code, in recent years
the number and proportions of petitioners for rehabilitative relief have
increased to such an extent that a course featuring only liquidation bank-
ruptcy would be seriously incomplete. Professor Morris Shanker has recently
published an argument that bankruptcy should be a required law school
course because of the opportunity it affords students and teacher to inter-
relate other fields of law in a single course.43 Professor Boshkoff points out
that this opportunity also exerts hydraulic pressure on the teacher as she
endeavors to cope with the demands of a well designed course within the
tight time limits of three semester hours. I recall that during my last few
trips through debtors' and creditors' rights I was beset by a constant
temptation to lecture lest significant issues and aspects be neglected.
Professor Boshkoff does not comment on the riches provided by A WFOD
for classrooms where courses in consumer law or consumer credit regulation
are still being offered. The A.A.L.S. Directory of Law Teachers 1988-89
lists more than 100 members of law school faculties that classify themselves
as teachers of Consumer Law." The amount of classroom time and space
in the published course materials that are devoted to consumer bankruptcy,
including Chapter 13, varies considerably, but the information now available
in A WFOD about consumer debtors in distress and what happens to those
who seek relief under the Bankruptcy Code opens new vistas for teachers
and students interested in consumer law. The subject appears to have
declined in importance as a curricular concern during the last decade, as it
has also received less attention from Congress, state legislatures, adminis-
trative agencies, and the courts. To Professor Boshkoff's optimism about
42. Professor Boshkoff refers in footnotes to 19 coursebooks used in the teaching of
bankruptcy. Id. at 66 nn.6-8. He does not mention a recent addition, A. COHEN & L. FORMAN,
BANKRUPTCY, ARTICLE 9 AND CREDITORS' REMEDIES: PROBLEMS, CASES, MATERIALS (2d ed.
1989). This work clearly fits in the group of materials following the third route. One half of
its pages are allocated to nonbankruptcy law. Two chapters of the bankruptcy half of the
work deal with Chapters 13 and 11, but they take up only 12% of the total pages.
43. Shanker, Why the Bankruptcy Course Ought to be Mandatory, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC.
299 (1989).
44. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, THE DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1988-89
(1988).
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the influence of A WFOD in raising the level of attention to consumer
bankruptcy in bankruptcy courses, I add my expectation that this seminal
study will energize teachers and students of consumer law to take greater
interest in the problems of consumer debtors.
In the second division of his article, Professor Boshkoff discusses ability
to pay and the choice between Chapter 7 and 13 as possible foci of classroom
discussion. He suggests that classroom attention may more wisely be directed
to a consideration of how to go about determining the facts needed by a
legislature in formulating consumer bankruptcy policy than to the factual
findings of A WFOD.45 He acknowledges some disappointment with his own
efforts to follow this suggestion-a not surprising reaction in view of the
difficulty of channelizing the discussion and developing confident conclu-
sions within the time reasonably available/ 6 He regards the findings of
A WFOD as to the distribution of debtors between Chapter 7 and 13 so
surprising and disturbing that he can hardly believe "that Chapter 13 can
retain its current prominent status in the bankruptcy world. ' 47 His query
whether classroom consideration of Chapter 13 should not be sharply
reduced appears to give more weight to A WFOD's animadversions on the
reasons debtors use Chapter 13 than to the trends and extent of actual use
of the chapter. His conclusion that the roles of lawyers and judges in
bankruptcy administration deserve classroom exploration is less debatable.
In a final, brief section Professor Boshkoff observes that the A WFOD
findings regarding the low level of prebankruptcy debt collection activity
suggest that casebook editors should devote less space and time to non-
bankruptcy remedies of creditors. The near-demise of prejudgment remedies
following in the wake of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.48 renders that
subject one of largely historical interest only, but recently enacted federal
regulation of several aspects of debtor-creditor relations easily fills any gaps
created by the passing of attachment and prejudgment garnishment. I remain
one of the old guard with Professors Countryman, Riesenfeld, and King49
who believe that an understanding of the functioning of state creditors'
remedies is a prerequisite to a satisfactory understanding of the interrela-
tionship between state and federal law in the application of the Bankruptcy
Code. I am gratified to note that the most recently published casebook in
this field devotes two chapters and a substantial number of pages to
nonbankruptcy law governing debt creation and collection. 0
45. See Boshkoff, supra note 41, at 72.
46. Id. at 73 n.68.
47. Id. at 75.
48. 295 U.S. 337 (1969).
49. Boshkoff, supra note 41, at 69 & nn.35-37.
50. See A. ConEN & L. Fo1mAsN, supra note 42.
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Professor Boshkoff's conclusion that "[iln view of the tension 'between
the statute's complexities and the small amounts at stake,' it is entirely
appropriate to devote a greater amount of classroom time to coverage of
matters more likely to be encountered by attorneys for individual debtors" 5'
is not controvertible.
HAS THE TIM COM TO REPEAL CHAPTER 13?
WILLIAM C. WI-ITORD
The authors of As We Forgive Our Debtors conclude that their findings
are both reassuring and troubling:
The data suggest that the present bankruptcy system works, at least in
the sense that it gives debtors in trouble some chance to start over....
But bad news comes with the good. The data show a bankruptcy
system that poorly serves many who seek its protection....
... In the short run, we look for changes in the widespread love
affair with Chapter 13 among the professionals who do not actually
have to live with the budgets and payoff plans.52
The principal supports for the conclusion that the system works poorly
appear to be that (1) the incentives provided in Chapter 13 to induce debtors
able to pay significant portions of their indebtedness to choose that chapter
rather than Chapter 7 have not been effective, because the characteristics
of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 debtors studied in the course of the survey
are pretty much indistinguishable; and (2) the 67% failure rate of Chapter
13 plans in the districts studied is fairly positive proof that the system is
not working. 3
Neither the characteristics of Chapter 11 debtors nor the failure rate of
Chapter 11 petitions was examined or compared. The failure rate for Chapter
7 debtors was not considered; presumably, a Chapter 7 discharge would
not have been classified as a failure merely because creditors did not receive
any distribution. Denials of discharge in Chapter 7 cases might conceivably
be classified as failures of a kind, but presumably such failures would not
be chargeable to an operational inadequacy of the bankruptcy system.
Nevertheless Professor Whitford picks up the ball put in play by authors
Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook and runs with it. The arresting title to
Professor Whitford's contribution is not merely a come-on to curious readers
or a tongue-in-cheek rejoinder to the proponents of a compulsory Chapter
13 of the Bankruptcy Code. He believes that many debtors are inveigled
into taking on the burdens of a protracted, costly, and ultimately frustrating
51. Boshkoff, supra note 41, at 82 (footnote omitted).
52. AWFOD, supra note 5, at 340.
53. See Whitford, Has the Time Come to Repeal Chapter 13?, 65 IND. L.J. 85, 92 (1989).
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regimen when Chapter 7 better meets their needs. His point of view is
strictly that of the debtor and the debtor's family; his calculus does not
include the creditors' interests, the national economy, or the proper role of
government as a regulator of credit and commerce generally. Thus he makes
no reference to the amount of payments of debts made by Chapter 13
debtors.
He identifies and then attacks eight supposed benefits to debtors who opt
for Chapter 13: (1) the chapter provides a mechanism that enables a debtor
to repay some debts "for reasons of personal morality or in order to
maintain continuing relations with some creditors"; (2) it responds to a
debtor's desire to avoid the stigma of bankruptcy; (3) it affords relief to a
debtor who wants to avoid a burdensome liability that is dischargeable only
in a Chapter 13 case; (4) it enables a debtor who is precluded from obtaining
a discharge by the six-year bar of section 727(a)(8) to receive a discharge
in a Chapter 13 case; (5) it enables a debtor to avoid repossession of a
necessary asset (other than a home) and to avoid default by stretching out
payments to a secured creditor; (6) it enables a debtor who has fallen
behind in payments on a mortgage on the debtor's home to obtain a stay
of foreclosure and to cure the default; (7) it enables a debtor to keep
nonexempt property; and (8) the debtor may obtain protection of a cosigner
from execution until she can pay.14
Professor Whitford considers the superdischarge granted to Chapter 13
debtors a sacrifice of the interests of the holders of claims not dischargeable
in Chapter 7 cases for the benefit of other creditors who will collect more
in Chapter 13 cases.15 He does not note that the holders of the claims
affected by the superdischarge are included in the group of distributees
under the confirmed Chapter 13 plans, nor does he cite any evidence to
show that holders of claims not discharged in Chapter 7 cases fare better
than creditors of Chapter 13 debtors who complete payments under con-
firmed plans. Professor Whitford suggests that it would be a more defensible
policy for Congress to pay the holders of claims not dischargeable under
Chapter 7 out of the public purse than to confer the benefit of discharging
their claims only on those Chapter 13 debtors who fully perform their
confirmed plans. 56 He regards the operation of the superdischarge as a
punishment of the debtors who cannot (or at least do not) choose Chapter
13 and an allocation of its proceeds to one creditor. 57 The further implication
of Professor Whitford's argument is that if Congress followed his suggestion
by repealing Chapter 13, it would make the benefits available to all (or at
least most) debtors, and that result would be desirable because it would
54. Id. at 94-104.
55. Id. at 96-97.
56. See id. at 97.
57. See id.
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eliminate the unhappy encounters many debtors are having by filing for
relief under Chapter 13 before discovering its perils and frustrations. 8
Professor Whitford's article is a welcome and wry antidote to the argu-
ments for a compulsory Chapter 13 or for restricting consumer debtors'
access to relief under Chapter 7.S9 The article is nevertheless unrealistic in
supposing that if the special benefits of Chapter 13 were eliminated, Con-
gress would be disposed to extend them to debtors generally. The article
does not suggest that the administrative burden of handling Chapter 13
cases jeopardizes or has a detrimental effect on the administration of relief
under other chapters. Professor Whitford sees the enthusiasts for Chapter
13 in the areas of the country where it has been extensively used as exploiters
of vulnerable debtors, who should be protected against the wiles of the
"local bankruptcy elite" who promote Chapter 13.60
Professor Whitford concludes that "[a]ny reasonable utilitarian calculus
emphasizing the greatest good for the greatest number of debtors is likely to
come down on the side of repeal. ' 6' However, he does not try to argue that
a reasonable utilitarian calculus emphasizing the greatest good for greatest
number of debtors and creditors and society at large would come down the
same way. He does not concede that Congress may weigh interests other than
the material interests of uninformed debtors in the utilitarian balance.
It is the conclusion of this commentator that the authors of As We Forgive
Our Debtors have made the convincing case that Professor Whitford highlights,
namely, that Chapter 13, as presently enacted does not serve well the needs
of uninformed consumer debtors without regular, disposable income. However,
Professor Whitford's argument for repeal of Chapter 13 would be more
persuasive if it recognized the appropriateness of a broader perspective.
WOMEN IN BANKRUPTCY AND BEYOND
ZIPpoi.AH BATSHAW WISEMAN
As the title indicates, Professor Wiseman's contribution focuses on the
women who have been debtors in the 1,502 cases examined by Sullivan,
Warren and Westbrook. In the first section of her article, Wiseman highlights
Chapter 8 of As We Forgive Our Debtors, entitled "Women and Bankruptcy,"
for its "compelling commentary on the economic plight of American women
who head households." 2 She identifies as the book's "most dramatic conclu-
58. Id.
59. See Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 953, 967-89
(1981); White, Personal Bankruptcy Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: An Economic Analysis,
63 IND. L.J. 1, 51 (1987-88).
60. Whitford, supra note 53, at 105.
61. Id.
62. Wiseman, Women in Bankruptcy and Beyond, 65 IND. L.J. 107, 109-10 (1989).
[Vol. 65:1
FOREWORD
sion" the fact "that the difference between the average single woman heading
a household who goes bankrupt and the one who does not, is not the money"
women themselves earn but "the additional income they receive from men-
child support and alimony-and from government support programs." 63 She
also finds it noteworthy that "[wiomen filing alone were the poorest bankrupts
in the study." 6
In the second section of her article, Professor Wiseman provides suggestions
for improving the economic position of women in our society. Initially, she
proposes increasing women's participation as lawyers in the bankruptcy system
in order to reduce discriminatory treatment of women bankrupts. More
concretely she proposes that law schools offer clinical courses or opportunities
for students to gain clinical experience in handling bankruptcy cases for
consumer debtors, including minorities, women and AIDS victims. She ac-
knowledges, however, that accessible legal representation for women in bank-
ruptcy will not address the more fundamental issues arising out of the economic
straits of women. A WFOD observes that bankruptcy has become a medical
insurer of last resort by discharging medical debt and shifting the cost to
practitioners, hospitals and the patients who pay their way, 65 but as Professor
Wiseman points out, the economic plight of women householders struggling
to care for children and other dependents and holding down jobs that take
them out of their homes goes beyond the difficulty of paying medical bills
and other obligations dischargeable in bankruptcy. While the United States
leads the world in affording a fresh start to debtors who resort to bankruptcy,
the policy of Western European countries, as Professor Wiseman points out,
is to afford economic support to single-parent families that relieves them from
incurring overwhelming debt burdens for health care and day care.
She closes with a brief proposal for a "woman-centered view of bank-
ruptcy." 66 She suggests that women should be compensated for the contribu-
tions they make (as homemakers and caretakers) to society. If women were
paid for their labor, many would be transformed from society's debtors to
society's creditors. For such dispensation the collection and distribution of the
debtor's estate and the debtor's fresh start, which are the hallmarks of
bankruptcy in this country, would be largely irrelevant. Although Professor
Wiseman admits that her suggestion is utopian, she argues that it may serve
as a vantage point from which other reforms can be evaluated.
A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON BANKRUPTCY
LISA J. McINTnE
Professor Lisa McIntyre adds the perspective of a sociologist to this sym-
posium. Her article focuses on the significance of the publication of As We
63. Id. at 110.
64. Id. at 113.
65. See AWFOD, supra note 5, at 173-75.
66. Wiseman, supra note 62, at 119-20.
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Forgive Our Debtors for sociological research. One gratifying result she predicts
is that at least for sociologists, Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook will render
pass6 Charles Warren's descriptions of bankruptcy as "a gloomy and depress-
ing subject" and "a dry and discouraging topic." 67 Two other anticipated
results are that (1) some sociologists at least will bring their research to bear
on the questions of whether bankruptcy law, its workings, and consequences
make any sense; and (2) many sociologists will inquire into the social and
psychological underpinnings of debtor-creditor relations.6
Picking up on the numerous references in A WFOD to the "social pathology"
or "social problem" of the current rate of bankruptcy filings, she wonders
whether the rate may not signify social health rather than malaise. 69 Her
comment echoes observations made to the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws
by Professor J. Fred Weston in 1971 at a conference of economists that,
contrary to popular opinion, the rate of resort to bankruptcy was arguably
too low.7 0 Whether rising hospital admissions and crime rates indicate greater
social sensitivity or a deterioration of social conditions has been the subject
of extended consideration by sociologists and members of other disciplines
and legislative policy-makers. 7' Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook's findings go
far to undermine the myth that bankruptcy is being exploited as a hideaway
for debtors able to pay their debts. Professor McIntyre appropriately suggests
that sociologically oriented research could investigate further the theory that
bankruptcy is a symptom of social pathology. She highlights the emphasis by
Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook of their findings that bankrupt debtors are
"part of mainstream America ' 7 2 and draws attention to the implications of
the increasing accumulation of debt-not only of economic vulnerability but
also of "the degree to which Americans increasingly have come to participate
in their economy." 73 She even tentatively suggests that "to the degree that
... risk of failure is distributed equally throughout society, bankruptcy could
be considered ... 'normal' for capitalistic society and not a symptom of
pathology." 74
This suggestion invites reference to the debate that has flourished during
the last few years about whether business debtors should be allowed to resort
67. McIntyre, A Sociological Perspective on Bankruptcy, 65 IND. L.J. 123, 123 (1989).
68. Id. at 123-24.
69. Id. at 124.
70. TRANSCRIPT OF CONFERENCE OF ECONOMISTS CONVENED BY THE COMMISSION ON BANK-
RUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, AT BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, D.C. 22
(August 23, 1971).
71. See, e.g., A. COCHRANE, EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY: REFLECTIONS ON HEALTH
SERVICES (1972); A. DONABEDIAN, MEDICAL CARE CHARTBOOK 17, 48, 58, 69 (8th ed. 1986);
Kamisar, How to Use, Abuse-and Fight Back with-Crime Statistics, 25 OKLA. L. REv. 239
(1972).
72. McIntyre, supra note 67, at 127 (citing AWFOD, supra note 5, at 141).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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to the bankruptcy laws for reasons characterized as business strategy without
proving insolvency.75
Professor McIntyre then notes the evidence adduced by Sullivan, Warren
and Westbrook that the risk of bankruptcy is distributed unevenly, with
particularly unfortunate effects on single-women and single-income families.
She recognizes that although this evidence is revealed by the authors' study
of the operation of the bankruptcy system, policy-makers need to consider
solutions broader than reform of the bankruptcy laws.76
Professor McIntyre discusses at some length the role of stigma as a more
effective determinant of debtor behavior than the economic incentives provided
by the bankruptcy laws. Early in the two-year life of the Commission on
Bankruptcy Laws, it received numerous communications, including a stack of
correspondence from Shelbyville, Indiana, urging the Commission to restore
the stigma to bankruptcy. The Commission did not implement this recom-
mendation and indeed eliminated the word "bankrupt" from its draft of a
proposed new Bankruptcy Act-a recommendation followed by Congress in
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Nevertheless, it appears from the study
of Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook that bankruptcy stigma survives with a
life of its own, and that Chapter 13 debtors who complete performance of
their plans do so largely out of a sense that nonpayment will be perceived as
betrayal of a trust. Professor McIntyre concludes from the data presented by
these authors that although the consumer credit industry is willing to accept
the benefits from the prevalence of bankruptcy stigma, professional creditors
do not regard consumer-debtor default as evidence of moral blameworthiness
or shameful conduct. Their concern is focused on considerations of cost-
effectiveness and profitability. Their reliance is principally placed on objective
calculations of probabilities of payment by the whole body of debtors rather
than on investigations and determinations of personal morality of the debtors
as individuals.
As Professor McIntyre concludes, "Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook have
opened up a new window on an increasingly important social relation."' ' A
change in the social view of credit, about which more needs to be learned,
may have dramatic effects on debt-payment behavior and resort to bankruptcy.
75. See Cifelli, Management by Bankruptcy, FORTUNE, Oct. 31, 1983, at 69; DiPietro &
Katz, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code-Use or Abuse?, 57 CoNN. B.J. 418 (1983);
Kennedy, Creative Bankruptcy? Use and Abuse of the Bankruptcy Law-Reflection on Some
Recent Cases, 71 IowA L. REv. 199, 202-04 (1985); Note, Manville: Good Faith Reorganization
or "Insulted" Bankruptcy, 12 Ho'STRA L. Rav. 121 (1983); Comment, Will Financially Sound
Corporate Debtors Succeed in Using Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act as a Shield Against
Massive Tort Liability?, 56 TEbP. L.Q. 539, 564-67 (1983).
76. McIntyre, supra note 67, at 127-28.
77. Id. at 139.
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